Access Controls

Larix program ID "7Zb1bGi32pfsrBkzWdqd4dFhUXwp5Nybr1zuaEwN34hy" with the owner "GwqwyQqJ5kr3X7iUDQKgJ1FJYjxmCieiY5PikmMbsL1Q", is controlled by the Larix team. Since the Solana blockchain is still in the beta version, our program can be upgraded in order to fix the errors in a timely manner if deemed absolutely necessary. Currently, our program does not have time locks, but later we will change the protocol to community governance and add time locks simultaneously.

Description	Address
Program	7Zb1bGi32pfsrBkzWdqd4dFhUXwp5Nybr1zuaEwN34hy
Upgrade authority	GwqwyQqJ5kr3X7iUDQKgJ1FJYjxmCieiY5PikmMbsL1Q

Our code is not "Anchor verified" yet, but we will look into doing so soon.

This lending market owner contains all the reserves of our main pool and the isolated pools from the Lending Launchpad. We transmit a tx through lending market owner to suspend deposit, borrowing, and withdrawal. We allow withdrawal suspension only in case of major security incidents, i.e. preventing hackers from withdrawing funds. We are also able to adjust deposit and borrow limits respectively and parameter configuration to ensure the utmost security of the protocol, but we cannot take control of users' assets.

We will explain the purpose of this through the following 2 examples:

Adjust the collateral factor&Suspend the deposit function: When UST lost it's peg, we adjusted the collateral factor of UST in a timely manner and suspended the deposit function of UST, to protect the protocol and the security of user assets.

Adjustment of deposit and borrow limits: During the attack on Solana’s cross-chain bridge Wormhole, hackers minted 120,000 wETH. In order to prevent losses caused by the 'depeg' of ETH and wETH, we lowered the wETH collateral factor and deposit limit in a timely manner. Please refer to product update for the latest collateral factor and deposit limit information.

Description	Address
Lending market owner	EknzKAAkFzbD1mY7ovWZVtuFptgetn5yw99LSqfE6XH9